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This paper is a study of the current state of the art,
in both the theory and actual practice, of electricity
pricing in the United States under capacity and revenue
constraints. It is also an attempt to derive an efficient
pricing policy that will be applied to large Government
installations. A mathematical formulation of electricity
pricing using two different approaches is presented.
Components of the total cost of service are examined
along with various methods of allocating them among classes
of customers. Also discussed are difficulties in allocating
capacity costs due to the existence of joint costs. Commonly
used methods of allocating capacity costs are presented
along with a discussion of the merits of each. Finally,
this paper explores the impact of electricity generation
upon the environment, especially thermal and air. pollution,
and methods of controlling each type of pollution in the
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. I. INTRODUCTION
Essentially, the electric utility business is the same
as any other privately owned enterprise. The utility gets
its capital in the competitive money market and therefore
it must make a margin over operating expenses to stay in
business . There are, however, three important differences
between the electric utility and the usual business enter-
prise. First, the utility has an obligation to serve all
who apply for service. Second, the utility does not have
direct competition; that is, only one utility operates in
an area, except in isolated instances. Third, in place of
direct competition, government regulation is substituted.
The first of these requires that the utility is always in
a state of readiness, that is, ready to anticipate a sudden
increase in capacity or energy demands. Thus, the electric
utility should be looked upon as a normal business enterprise
with the added element of regulation.
One of the principle objectives of State regulation is,
of course, to limit the earnings of the utilities to a "fair"
return on the true value of the property. Of equal impor-
tance is the quality of service rendered by the utility,
such as, continuity of service, frequency control and vol-
tage regulation. The deterioration of the quality of elec-
trical service would itself and through its economic reper-
cussion degrade the national life. What then becomes a

major issue is the manner in which the rates of the utility
service should be determined in the absence of normative
definition of "fair return". Further complications arise
as a result of significant variations in the demands not
only over the months and the year, but also on a weekly
and daily basis.
This thesis is an attempt to establish a picture of the
underlying theory concerning utility service pricing along
with the actual practices by the utility enterprises. Along
the way we highlight the difficulties faced by the utility
enterprise in following both the marginal cost pricing
principle and state regulations. Increasing returns and
technical characteristics of the system are the cause of
the former, while vagueness is the reason for the latter.
Section II develops the mathematical formulation of
electricity pricing under capacity and revenue constraints,
which leads to the conclusion that price is, in general,
not equal to marginal cost. In particular, this section
deals with the problem of variable demands for the utility
services
.
Section III discusses the total cost of service and all
the cost components that go into it. Here, the difficulties
in measuring the marginal cost and the vagueness of the
State regulation are presented. The main concern of this
section is to show that in practice the amount of allowable
revenue is predetermined by the Commission before the rate
is set-up, thus forcing the utility to deduce what appropriate

rates will produce that revenue, Instead of, what rates are
"fair" to the consumers.
Section IV describes the apportionment of the total cost
of service into three cost categories, that is, customer
costs, demand costs and energy costs. The allocation of
each category into classes of service is also discussed.
As a result of the attempt to fully allocate the total cost
of service, we will find in this section that the customer
costs category becomes the "dumping place" for all unallo-
cated costs.
In Section V, various rate forms are discussed together
with its rules and provisions. It is common practice to
"block" the rate of a tariff to induce higher consumption
at a reduced price. Further sales promotion efforts are
embodied in the provisions of the tariff. Thus, the tariff
of the utility services can be looked upon as the actual
pricing practices by the enterprise.
Section VI deals with the effects of electric generation
upon its environment. It was only recently that the public
became acutely aware that clean air is an important natural
resource, and demanded a reduction in emissions to the at-
mosphere, even though such demand may result in increased
prices for services. Also, the waste heat, discharged to
bodies of water by the power plants, has become the target
of the environmentalists as well as State and Federal Com-
missions. The prime interest of this section is to show
that the incremental cost of pollution control over the

operating cost prior to the installation of the pollution
devices is very small and therefore no additional charge
to the customer is necessary.
The last section is the conclusion of this thesis along
with a suggestion of areas for further study.
Finally, as a reflection for the difficulties in setting-
up a fair rate, we quote the words of Prof. James. C. Bon-
bright: "The art of rate making is an art of wise compro-
mise" which is ironically true.

II. THE VARIABLE LOAD PROBLEM
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A public utility company usually operates under two
major constraints, i.e., capacity and return from operations
The latter gives rise to the departure of price from margin-
al cost as shown independently by Steiner [31] > Williamson
[38] and others [24, 27]. Furthermore, it also dictates
how far the price is allowed to deviate from the marginal
cost so that the net return from operations does not violate
the standard of "fair return" set by the Government and yet
enough to cover all expenses.
The basic questions each company faces are: What rates
charged to consumers may be judged reasonable or fair?
What are the appropriate concepts or standards of reasonable-
ness or fairness?
The answers to those questions depend upon the local
conditions and the approach that one used. One of the
approaches that is mathematically tractable is that of
value-of-service which gives recognition to the demand
side of the market. The value derives primarily from the
fact that they can satisfy consumer's needs and wants so
effectively that consumers are willing to pay a price to
acquire them.
One definition of the value of service that lends itself
more readily to reasonable quantification - and hence to
10

mathematical tractability - uses the economic notion of
consumer's surplus concept; that is, the difference between
what a consumer would be willing to pay for a service and
what he actually pays. Thus, from the consumer's point of
view, the consumer's surplus is a measure of net benefit he
derives from buying a certain quantity of good or service.
If we consider the benefit to both the consumer and the
producer, then the total gross benefit will be defined as
the consumer's surplus plus the total revenue. The net
benefit, therefore, can be defined as the gross benefit
minus the total cost.
Hence, by maximizing the net benefit enjoyed both by
the consumer and the producer, the reasonableness of the
price of the utility services can be achieved and at the
same time enough return for the company can be guaranteed
so that its obligations to the stockholders can be met.
As a result, the goal of the utility company can be
formulated as follows:
maximize (net benefit)
which is equivalent to:
max. (gross benefit - total cost)
which is equivalent to




This is the objective function which represents the utility
company's goal. The constraints are:
profit <_ some predetermined value
and
capacity demanded <_ maximum capacity of
the utility.
B. FORMULATION OF THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
Let P* be the equilibrium price that the consumer
actually pays for the equilibrium quantity q* (Fig. 1). For
each quantity q, < q < q*, the consumer would be willing
to pay an excess price P(q) > P* rather than go without it
entirely. Thus buying q* units at price P* the consumer
accumulates some satisfaction in the form of excess price.
This satisfaction has been designated the consumer's surplus
Denoting consumer's surplus by S, this surplus becomes
q* q*
S = / {P(q) - P*}dq = / P(q)dq - P*q* (1)
where the first term on the right hand side is the gross
benefit and the second term is the total revenue derived
from the sale of q*. Assume that the demand for the i
good is independent of any other good, then each good will
yield a surplus of the form of Equation (1), i.e.:
S
±





And the total consumer's surplus is given by:
n




S / P, (q. )dq,
i=l 111 i=1Z Pi *qi * (3)
An extension of Equation (3) was given by Steiner [31]
who allowed demand for different goods to be interdependent
The gross benefit for each good was represented by:
F
±
= /_ P^q. W
where P. = P.(q..
, q 2 , ..., q. , ..., q ). The total gross
benefit would then be:
n n
I P, = If P.dq.




As a result of the inter-dependency between demands, cross
elasticity exists, which implies that the value of the inte-
gral in (5) depends upon the path of integration and there-
fore the objective will not have a unique first derivative.







the economic meaning of which is that there be no income
effect between those goods [30].
Now, since the demand for electricity can be classified
as occurring either during the peak or the off-peak period,
they can be considered as two different goods offered at
different times. Therefore, for our convenience, the










and the net benefit is:







where, C(q,,qp>K) is the total cost incurred by the company.






c (q 1 ^2 jK) - M ; 1 = lj2 (8)
The second constraint is the capacity constraint; that is
demand in each period does not exceed maximum capacity or:
q±
< K ; 1.-1,2 (9)
The cost function C(q-.,q 2 ,K) consists of two parts,
i.e., the variable cost in each period and the fixed cost




1 (q 1 ,K) + D2 (q 2 ,K)
+ q(K) (10)
If the variable cost functions are linear functions of q





,K) = bq-,^ + bq
2
+ BK (11)
where b is the operating cost per unit per period and 8 is
the cost per unit of capacity.
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C. THE INDEPENDENT DEMAND MODEL
Reformulation of what has been described in the pre-
ceeding paragraph is as follows:
2
max / Z P,dq, - C(q, ,q P ,K) (12)
i=l x x -1
s.t. Z P.q, - C(q ,q ,K) < M.
i=l 1 x L d
q±
< K i = 1,2
q, < 0, K > i * 1,2
where P. = P. (q. ,q 2 ) and the total cost function is that
given by Equation (10). The Lagrangian of the above problem
is
/ Z P.dq, - C(qljq?J K) + A[ Z P.q, - C(q ,q K) - M]
i=1 i i 1 d ±=1 l l i d
2
- Z y,(q, - K) (13)
i=l x 1




<1+ ^ pl-%> + \l^5 5^- V° d«
2
( r Y± > - (1 + X) || < (15)
q±
- K < (16)
£ P.q, - c - m < o (17)
i=l 1 1
When demand is assumed independent, P.. = P (q ) and
Pp = Pp(qp), several important cases are:




P2<*2> = Iqf . (19)
which says that price is equal to the marginal cost. Also
we get,
3C 8D 1 3D? so"Ik = ± + ± + 23. = o (20)8K 3K 3K 3K u ^ u;
which says that the marginal cost increase in expanding the
utility capacity by one unit is offset by a marginal cost
decrease in operation costs, which is similar to that
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obtained by Mohring [24]. Observe also that (20) means that
the capcity of the utility is at an optimum.
b) X = -1 and y±
= i = 1,2.























— 7p- is the demand elasticity of price,
i q1 d?±
Equation (21) tells us either P. = or e.= °° which
implies that price is already set by the market.
c) X < 0, X ^ -1 and Yj_ = i = 1,2.
Equation (lM) becomes
W S + (m> i7W (22),q i ' v » '1
Notice that if -1 < X < 0, the second term of the right hand
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side in Equation (22) is < 0, because e. > and therefore
price is less than marginal operating cost. But since the
production of electricity shows an increasing return, price
less than marginal cost, even without capacity constraint,
is unacceptable because total revenue will not recover total
cost incurred. In other words, marginal cost can be looked
upon as the lower bound of price. This leads Alfred Kahn
[21] to conclude that the starting point for economically
efficient pricing is the marginal cost.
D. THE DEPENDENT DEMAND MODEL
The demand functions are P. = P.(q-.,q
2 )
and as before,
several cases will be considered, i.e.:
a) X = o and Y
±
= i = 1,2.
The result will be similar to that given by Equations
(18), (19) and (20).
b) X = and Y, > 0, Y 2 = 0.
Here the capacity constraint is active during the first




3D, 3D.. 3D a-
p
i c«i-«2 ) " 3^ + [ 3ir + air + §£ ] < 2 3>
W^ = Sf (24)
Y
=1C
= !^1 + !^2 + 3q ( jT l 3K 3K 9K 3K v^ ;
q. = K and q 2 < K (26)
Observe that demand during peak periods will bear the margin-
al operating cost plus the marginal capacity cost, while
demand during off peak periods will bear only the marginal
operating cost.
e) X = -1 and y, > 0, y 2
=
°
Equations (14) through (16) will yield,
3P, 3P~




= - q13Q7 (28)
3P. 3P.

















f) X < 0, W-l and y 1 > 0, Y 2 = 0.
Equations (14) through (17) will yield
VW = ^ +m [^ + i^W*2 > + rrr
(30)
WV ' ^ + rrr ^ + «^W*2 J (31)3D 2 X r l 1
•2 * 2 12
3D. 3D, ,-








" D 2 (q 2> K) - q(K) = M (33)
and q_ K; q 2 < K.
Note that Equation (25) or (32) gives the optimum size of
the utility.
E. LINEAR COST FUNCTION WITH DEPENDENT DEMAND
For the linear case, the total cost function will take
the form of: C(q ,q ,K) = bq, + bq 2 + BK
where b is the unit operating cost per period; and 3 is
the cost of providing a unit of capacity.
a) X = and y. > 0, y 2 = 0.




1 (q 1 ,q 2 )
= b + Y2
(3*0
P




b) X < 0, X ^ -1 and y. > 0, y 2 = 0.
From (30) through (33) we will get
Y
Lpi<V q 2 > = b + r^r ^ + iJ^W^ + rr
(37)
P
2 (q l5 q 2 ) = b + I4T [i + ii-]P2 (q1 ,Q2 ) (38)12
Y
x




2 q 2 "
bK ~bq
2 "
BK = M (Z|0)
and q = K ; q 2 < K (4l)
F. A SOLUTION MODEL USING CONSUMER'S UTILITY FUNCTION
Mohring [24] saw the variable-load demand problem as a
resource allocation problem facing the economy. Without
having to make it too complicated, he assumed that the demand
for utility services consists of two parts, i.e. the peak-
period demand which he called X, and off-peak demand X~ •
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Furthermore he assumed a third goal, the demand of which is
X~. Similar to that of Williamson, the cost function was
treated in terms of the cycle-period outputs. Thus let
a. (i = 1,2) denote the fraction of time the demand is of
type i, and since the output is X. if the whole cycle had
been used to produce good i only then X./a. would have
actually been produced at a cost C(X,/a.,K), where K is the
annual cost of the public utility's capital plant, therefore
the operating cost of producing X. is a.C(X./a , K)
.
Let U (x. , x 2 , x_ ) be the individual utility function,
and (r - h ) is his income.





, x^, x^) (42)




x p + P 3
X
?
where r is the individual labour resources, h is his head





max WCU1 , U
2
, . .., U
n
) (43)
s.t. R = a.C. + a C
2
+ x + K
n








, K) , i = 1,
n
X = E x.
J i=l J
, J = 1,2,3
where W is the individualistic social welfare function.
Let Z be the Lagrangian of (43); its derivative with
respect to K is
9Z w !fl + !^i
9K ' MOt18K a 2 8K + 1)
= (44)
which gives us the optimum capacity similar to that of
Equation (20) derived in Paragraph (C).
Upon differentiation of Equation (43) with respect to
P..
















where S., = E(x.. - x, x., ), the sum of Hicks-SlutskyJk \jk ~k ~jh
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pure substitution effect, and x,. = 8x. /%?v . Since theJK J ft.





S-,] is invertible, therefore
it can be concluded that if no budget constraint exists,
the utility should operate at the point where price and
marginal cost (C,-, or C22 ) are equal.





D - a C - a
?
c o ~ K ^ is imP° se d to the















Since both S and S ?2 are negative while |S| > 0, therefore,
if the utility service in peak and off-peak periods are
substitutes, S 12 (=S p ,) will have a positive value and hence
optimization subject to budget constraint requires that a
price greater than marginal cost be charged in both periods.
On the other hand, if the services in both periods are com-
plements, a price below marginal cost should be charged
during the off-peak period.
For the case when it is not possible to price differently
for the services in both periods, a single price constraint











is a combination of the marginal costs in both periods.
In all three cases mentioned above, the optimum capacity
level would lead to the saving in the variable cost due to
an increase in capacity because the increase in capacity
cost is exactly offset by a decrease in variable cost, as
for example, portrayed by Equation (44).
Thus, by using consumer's surplus concept for the public
utility enterprise's objective function, Pressmann has been
able to derive results which are of the form given us by
Mohring. From (20) and (25) it is interesting to note that
8 C
when no capacity constraint exists; i.e.
-ttt = 0, then
capacity should be increased to the optimum value when the
3D 3D
saving in operating marginal cost, i.e., (^tt— + w- ) ' is
just offset by the extra cost of acquiring new capacity.
The situation is relevant to the decision of expanding the
capacity by using new plant and thus obtaining lower operating
cost. Following Williamson [38], if demand is such that
b + y, > b + 3 and expected to remain at this level, then
an expansion is called for. While if b + Y-, < b + 3
plant should be retired.
In models with only capacity constraint and no profit
constraint prices are charged according to the marginal cost
pricing principle. The peak period is charged the full
marginal cost of capacity, while the off-peak period is
charged the short run marginal cost. If, however, full
capacity is utilized in both periods, then each period
shares the marginal capacity cost and the period with the
26

greater actual demand gets charged the larger share. This
is the principle appied by Houtakker to both peak and
potential peak period in his three periods scheme.
With the introduction of a profit constraint, the prices
depend on both the marginal cost and the elasticites of
demand which unquestionably leads to the departure from the
marginal cost pricing principle. Jefferson [20] went even
further and specified that rates should be designed closer
to marginal cost for services which have elastic demand and
further away from the marginal cost for service which have
inelastic demand. This proposition, of course, a consequence
of Equation (37) either for a dependent demand or independent
demand model. Because the deviation from the marginal cost
contains a component which is proportional to (— + ),
e i e ij
if we are willing to assume that cross elasticity does not
exist, i.e., no term, then the more inelastic the demand
£ ij
the larger is the deviating component imposed by the profit
constraint. It may be that this is not a desirable policy
to be applied to the lowest income group customers because,
for example according to Berman et al [8], they show an
elasticity of -0.25 (with gas cross elasticity of +0.08).
Although the results presented in this section were
derived using consumer's surplus concept, they are similar
to that derived by Mohring [24] using utility concept and
also to that derived by Marcus Fleming [15]. They have in
common that in general price is not equal to the marginal
cost whenever the utility has to operate under profit and
27

and capacity constraints. However, it becomes apparent
that the marginal cost is the starting point whence price
will be determined. The amount of adjustment away from the
marginal cost is determined by, among other things, the
price elasticity of demand, consumer income and financial
obligations to the stockholders. Whatever concept is used,
in the final analysis, the main obstacle is the determina-
tion of the marginal cost itself. The difficulty in the
assessment of the marginal cost is due to the time element
that enters into the total cost.
28

III. THE COST STRUCTURE
A. COST CATEGORIES
The cost of electrical energy may be divided into the
following categories: a) fixed element; b) energy element;
c) customer element; and d) profit element. The first of
these is governed by the extent of plant investment and the
current financial rates. It remains a fixed sum regardless
of the amount of energy sold. The second is directly pro-
portional to the plant output. The customer element will
be proportional to the number of customers and nearly inde-
pendent of both the plant investment and its kilowatt-hour
production. The profit is that amount of return allowed
under the most recent regulation.
The sum of all cost elements of the utility is called
cost-of-service which consists of the following four func-
tional categories: a) operating cost; b) depreciation
charges; c) taxes; and d) a "fair" return on the net
valuation of the assets devoted to public service. There-
fore the revenue has to be able to cover the cost-of-service;
or in more compact form:





R = revenue requirement
E = operating expenses
d = depreciation charges (D = accumulated
depreciation)
T = taxes
V = gross valuation of the assets serving
the public
r = rate of return
(V - D)r = allowable net return (V - D is called the rate
base). Equation (47) is called the rate making formula,
the validity of which is obvious. However, in practice,
the fairness in the determination of each component of the
above equation is open to questions. Among the most contro-
versial is the determination of the last component.
B. OPERATING COST
Operating cost consists of the following major functional
parts, i.e., a) generating cost; b) bulk transmission costs;
c) distribution cost; d) metering and control system cost;
e) customer's account activity and related matters; f) sales
promotion; and g) general administrative cost.
1. Generating Cost
The generating cost is the cost of producing electric
energy inside a plant or plants. For a thermal generating
plant, the primary component of the generating cost is fuel
cost. In addition to fuel cost, maintenance cost and labor
cost are usually included. However, since labor is required
30

mainly to control rather than to operate a highly mechanized
facility, the basic input of labor is sufficient for a wide
range of operating output. It, therefore, may be assumed
that incremental labor costs are non-existent or extremely
low.
When generators are operated at higher capacities,
greater wear is to be expected. Despite maintenance proce-
dures, it is logical to assume that maintenance costs increase
with output. However, a finding by the Federal Power Com-
mission in 1970 as quoted by Sylvain Davis [13] shows the
opposite. The results are as follows:
TABLE 1
Average operation and maintenance costs in the
U.S. Fossil-fueled plants (in mills/kwh)
.
Year Net generation Operation Maintenance Total
in billion KWH
1956 446.0 .48 .39 .87
i960 556.5 .47 .38 .85
1965 796.9 .38 .37 .75
1968 1026.7 .37 .38 .75
From this data it is apparent that operating cost
and total cost are strongly related to net generation.
Maintenance cost did not vary. The decreasing operation
(generation) costs with increasing capacity support the
theoretical prediction given us by Equation (20). Thus,
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the real variable part of the generating costs is that of
fuel. But according to Da Silva [39] it is a common practice
of utility companies to assign maintenance cost as a variable
cost, and worse yet, the incremental maintenance costs are
set as a fixed percentage of the incremental fuel costs.
Note that in a hydraulic generating plant incremental fuel
costs are non-existent since the plant depends only on the
water-level of the reservoir. In the U.S., where the main
source of electric energy comes from thermal plants, it is
common that whenever variable costs are mentioned it will
always refer to thermal plants. In a system which consists
of both types of generating plants, one could never be sure
how the company determined its incremental variable cost
(in the case of PG and E, 30$ of its net output comes from
hydro plants)
.
An empirical determination of incremental fuel cost
in a thermal plant was introduced by Da Silva [14] using an
aggregation technique of the individual generator units. An
example of his result is presented in Table (2). The data
was obtained by setting the generators to operate at various
outputs and then measuring the thermal (BTU) input required
to maintain the output. The required BTU were then converted
to fuel requirements and finally to fuel costs. The data
was then arranged to reflect the incremental fuel cost for
the whole range of plant capacity (Table 3). Thus, for a
utility system consisting of many plants, the procedure can
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Cumulative Capacity in Order of Incremental Fuel
Max Output Cumulative Incremental Fuel




6 110 220 2.45
9 110 330 2.47
10 110 440 2.47
3 65 505 2.55
7 65 570 2.58
8 65 635 2.58
4 65 700 2.58
2 40 740 2.71
14 65 805 2.80
5 95 900 2.84
6 95 995 2.84
15 65 1060 2.86
16 65 1125 2.86
17 65 1190 2.86
18 65 1255 2.86
9 95 1350 2.87
10 37 1445 2.87
3 37 1482 2.96
7 37 1519 3.00
8 55 1556 3.00
13 35 1611 3.04
1 35 1646 3.06
2 37 1681 3.09
4 35 1718 3.12
11 35 1753 3.18
12 37 1788 3.18
15 37 1825 3.27
16 37 1862 3.27
17 37 1899 3.27
18 37 1936 3.31
14 37 1973 3.47
1 55 2028 3.65
11 40 2068 3.65
12 40 2108 3.66
2 23 2131 3.68
13 43 2174 4.60




figures of incremental fuel cost at each plant. From Table
(3) j for example, a demand of say 1500 MW could be produced
by that plant with an incremental fuel cost of 3.00 mills
per kilowatt-hour.
To insure rate stability, a provision to the rate
schedule is always attached which will give the necessary
adjustment to the rates as a result of fuel cost variation.
For example, in the 1973 rate of PG and E, the fuel adjust-
ment is as follows: "The fuel cost adjustment amount shall
be the product of the total kilowatt-hours for which the
bill is rendered multiplied by 0.159 cents per kilowatt-hour"
With that the basic rates remain the same, unaffected by
the fuel cost variation.
2 . Transmission Cost
The variable cost of transmission results from energy
loss in the system between the generating plants and the
distribution stations. Its finding is made by comparing
the annual production and the annual sales recorded at all
distribution stations. The difference between those two
figures is the annual energy loss or dollar cost due to
transmission. Therefore, it is difficult if not impossible
to find the exact incremental cost of transmission because
of the complicated network of the system and also because
transmission is subject to sharply increasing returns.
Boiteux and Stassi [10] offered a method to calculate
the marginal cost of transmission for a system consisting
of both thermal and hydro plants. Their claim was that the
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most economical management of a system of interconnected
thermal and hydro plants, both at optimum, is secured by
a certain configuration of energy movement. This configura-
tion possesses the following property at every point in time
a) On every segment of the transmission network between two
nodes A and B (Figure below), energy moves from A
where energy is cheaper toward B where it is more
expensive, and the marginal cost at B is equal to
the marginal cost at A, increased by the marginal
transmission cost from A to B.
N
B
b) There exists between A and B a neutral point N,
where the marginal cost of energy from A, increased
by the marginal transmission cost from A to N, is
equal to the marginal cost of energy from B^
increased by the cost of transmission from B to N.
Therefore it is sufficient to know the marginal costs at one
node of the network, and the optimum configuration of energy
movements at each moment, to deduce, step by step, the
marginal costs at all nodes of the network. This enables
a load dispatcher at the central station to send additional
load requirements to a certain area at the lowest cost.
However, care must be taken since the output of a hydro
plant depends upon the water level in the reservoir. Suppose
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all thermal plants are concentrated at a single node T,
and all hydro centers are at H (see following figures).
N
T H T H
r\ r\ Q r\\j
..
*^* i <r* (N)*r |V»
Dry Year Wet Year
In a dry year, the line TH is not at full capacity, and the
marginal cost at H is derived from the marginal cost at T by
allowing only for losses. The drier the year, the higher the
marginal cost at T, the closer the neutral point N will be
to H, and the higher the marginal cost at H.
Conversely, the wetter the year, the lower the
marginal cost at H. Above a certain level of water supply,
the point N will come all the way to T, the, with the substi-
tution of hydro energy increasing in proportion as the year
becomes wetter, a moment will come when the line HT will be
at full capacity.
The model given above has two drawbacks, i.e., first,
the calculation of marginal cost at a node requires the
determination of marginal transmission cost from the pre-
ceeding node which we know is very difficult to assess
except on an annual basis for the entire system. Second,
the two node hydro-thermal representation is misleading
without further assumptions because the marginal cost of
generation in a hydro plant is almost non-existent.
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Therefore, we have to settle down with the annual
energy loss due to transmission and then averaging it over
total sales. In the face of sharply increasing return this
is possibly the best way to take.
3. Distribution Cost
In addition to transmission and generation costs,
the costs of distribution must be recovered if the principle
of "fair" return is to be maintained. The distribution costs
increase the expenses of owning and operating lines, distri-
bution stations, and other equipment which serve to connect
individual customers to the main transmission network. The
distribution costs also cover the energy loss between the
distribution stations and customers' premises, billing and
metering costs. Annual determination of the distribution
costs can be done in the same way as the transmission costs
discussed in the previous paragraph. According to a survey
conducted by the F.P.C. in 1970 [35] the average annual
costs of distribution in the U.S. is equivalent to 5-5 mills
per kilowatt-hour sold.
The cost of an individual's connection depends
solely on the consumption of the customer and, therefore,
he should be charged accordingly. In practice, however,
such a scheme would require up to as many different rates
as there are customers. To avoid complication, an equal
charge is applied to customers within a class. The distri-
bution costs to be allocated to customer classifications
include such things as maintenance, general supervision,
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and accounting. For example, the cost of maintaining the
street lighting system in a given area will be allocated
to street-lighting customers, usually municipalities. Here
again, we see that the variable cost of distribution includes
components that otherwise can be assigned as fixed.
4 . Sales Promotion and General Administration
Sales promotion activity generally includes two
functions, i.e., customer contracts and sales of new or
increased use of the utility's service. It usually includes
cost of local and national advertising, demonstrations of
utility's availability of service, and others. A close
study of cost records by functional activities will provide
an adequate segregation to classes of service.
General administration covers the costs of all activ-
ities of that nature, including general management, general
accounting, property records, etc. Since these costs are
of an overhead nature they are spread over all classes of
service.
In summary, from the exposition of all elements of
operating costs, it is apparent that the marginal operating
cost (= b in our notation) is very difficult to determine.
This is due to the inclusion of otherwise fixed costs in
the variable costs. But since in practice we are more con-
cerned about Equation (42) rather than (3*0 or (35) > such
inclusion is perfectly legitimate as long as the resulting






Changes for depreciation are not current cash payments
or obligations. They constitute estimated periodic amounts
required for ultimate retirement of plant items as the items
become unsuited for efficient and economical operation. The
function of depreciation charges is to include in the total
current costs appropriate amounts to absorb the costs of the
longer life property items during the years of their economic
service lives. The purpose is to apportion gradually the
original property costs charged to capital accounts at
installation to income accounts as cost of operation during
the economic service lives of the various property units.
The calculation of depreciation charges, commonly used
by U.S. utility companies, is based on the so-called
"straight-line" method. This involves equal annual charges
which will accumulate during the economic service lifetime
of the property units and their original costs (subject to
adjustment for their salvage value). Determination of the
economic service lifetime of the various property units of
a company is a matter of managerial estimate, but it should
be subject ot commission approval or requirement. The
estimates should be re-examined periodically, and the depre-
ciation percentages should be revised upward or downward as
experience reveals that the economic service life of some
item is, in fact, shorter or longer than had been previously
assumed. In principle, the annual depreciation charges for
a plant unit should be equal during its economic service
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life, but naturally there are variations if the life estimates
are adjusted during the period of its economical operation.
The economic service life of an installed unit, as esti-
mated for the calculation of its annual depreciation charge,
extends from the time of its installation and placement in
service to the time when its over-all economy in operation
has declined to a point where it could be replaced at equal
over-all annual cost by a new unit. That point measures the
end of the economic service life of the existing unit. It
is simple in concept but in application it involves many
variables and uncertainties. At the installation of a new
plant unit, its economic service life is at best an intelli-
gent guess. Thereafter economic service life will be affected
by unpredicted shifts in technological developments, service
demands, and changes of price level.
Although straight-line method of calculating annual
depreciation charges has been used extensively in U.S. public
utility companies, it has the abstract imperfection that it
provides equal annual charges for all classes of plant,
notwithstanding the fact that some important plant groups
are subject ot relatively more intensive use during their
earlier years in operation than later. (It is a common
practice to meet demand with the most efficient plant which
is usually the newest one.) It would therefore seem more
correct to have plant unit depreciation provisions deter-
mined on an "accelerated" basis.
1*0

Where proper accounting has been maintained throughout
the past in regard to original plant costs, annual depreci-
ation charges, and reserve accruals, the result can be taken
directly from the accounts for rate making purposes or the
determination of long-run marginal cost.
In current rate cases, however, there are still conflicts
of interest and disputes in regard to proper provisions for
depreciation in the annual costs of the company. If the
existing reserve is inadequate, the company strives to make
up the deficiency through higher depreciation provisions
than justified on proper plant cost allocation; the consumers
oppose. Conversely, if the reserve is excessive, the
consumer side demands a reduction in the annual allowance to
bring the reserve down to proper amount; the company opposes.
This conflict is mainly due to the imprecise definition of
fairness in return and thus with proper regulation the situ-
ation can be corrected, hopefully.
D. TAXES
Taxes differ from all other costs in that they are
imposed by governmental bodies. They do not depend on
company management and are not direct operating costs as
such. Nevertheless, they are costs paid by the company and
so are properly included in the total annual costs and in
the rates paid by consumers. There are two kinds of tax
payments or accruals for rate making: a) ordinary or
general taxes, and b) income taxes. The former consist of
Ml

payments that reflect direct assessments upon properties
and activities relating to public service, including fran-
chise or other taxes levied on gross operating revenues.
General taxes, regardless of the amounts, are includible in
full for rate making. In fact, they are really paid by
the consumers. The company merely serves as the tax collecting
agency for local, state, and federal governments.
The latter consist of tax payments or accruals on income
including excess profit taxes. These are predicated upon
the net earnings of the company after provision for operating
expenses, depreciation, general taxes, interest, and other
deductible allowances. After all deductions from gross
utility revenues and nonutility income have been made, the
balance of earnings is subject to the income levies as
fixed by Congress, or as fixed by the legislative bodies
of those states and municipalities that have income taxes.
Because of the high federal income taxes, it is particu-
larly important that a clear-cut perspective be adopted for
the purpose of determining proper costs in the fixing of
rates. Taxable income consists of net earnings as realized
under existing rates - whether they be reasonable, excessive,
or inadequate. For this reason, actual payments or accruals
obviously cannot be taken directly as cost for the fixing
of reasonable rates, unless the existing rates are in face
reasonable. If the rates are excessive, the income tax is
high accordingly. Thus, if the actual payments or accruals
were to be taken as cost for rate making, they would support
l\2

the continuance of excessive rates. Conversely, if rates
are inadequate, the related low income taxes, if taken for
rate making, would correspondingly perpetuate inadequate
rates.
The correct principle is, according to John Baver [4],
to calculate for rate making purposes the income tax that
would be payable under reasonable rates. The amount as
derived would be taken as cost of service to be included in
the fixing of rates. Application of this principle precludes
continued support of either excessive or inadequate rates;
it provides for the inclusion of income taxes in accordance
with reasonable rates. Hence, for such income tax provisions
predicated on reasonable rates, there must be prior deter-
mination of the net return to which the stockholders are
entitled.
E. THE RATE BASE
The last term of Equation (42) is the amount of allowable
return which the company is entitled to. But the amount
of this return is usually calculated through the application
of a percentage rate (= r in our notation) to a so-called
rate base. We now turn to the measurement of this rate
base - perhaps the most widely disputed legal issue in the
history of public utility regulation.
The rate base is composed principally of the net valu-
ation of the public utility's tangible property, comprising
the plant and equipment used and useful in serving the public
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(fixed capital). In addition, the rate base includes an
allowance for working capital and, depending on the circum-
stances, may also include amounts for the overhead costs of
organizing the business, intangibles, and going concern
value. The key issue in the determination of the rate base
is the valuation of the public utility's plant and equipment.
At the heart of this controversy is the fact that the total
valuation of plant and equipment may vary with the particular
method of valuation applied. Implicit in this controversy is
the fact that the greater the valuation of public utility
tangible property, the greater will be the rate base and,
therefore, the total cost of service, other things remaining
equal. Of course, the reverse is also true. Essentially,
there are three valuation methods: a) actual cost less
depreciation; b) reproduction cost new less depreciation;
and c) "fair value."
1. Actual Cost Methods
Actual cost determinations of public utility tangible
property may employ either the historical cost, prudent
investment or the original cost method. Historical cost
usually can be found by consulting the books and records of
the company. In that event, the property element in the rate
base is the sum of the amounts actually spent for initial
construction, acquisitions, and addition and improvements
less depreciation. The historical cost, thus found, plus an
allowance for the overhead charges incurred during construc-




The prudent investment method of determining actual
cost would subtract from depreciated historical cost any
amounts found to be dishonest or obviously wasteful.
However, every investment is assumed to be reasonable until
the contrary is shown.
A third actual cost method is the "original cost"
approach. Original cost is the cost of the property in its
first use as public utility plant , less depreciation [4],
The principle advantages of actual cost are administrative
simplicity and stability. Administrative simplicity has
been made possible in large part by the fact that uniform
systems of accounts, set up by the F.P.C., have been put
into effect which provide a verified source of data on the
costs of property construction and acquisition as well as
depreciation. The second principal advantage of actual
cost is its stability. The cost of tangible property units,
when properly recorded in the company's plant accounts,
have not been subject ot unpredictable fluctuation.
But, despite its definiteness, the actual cost
can be misleading because, first, it assumes that the
dollar is a unit of measure of constant economic size, when
it is not. Second, during period of inflation, other things
remaining equal, it results in a declining rate of return —
as measured in terms of the value of money. In an investor
owned utility company, this is a serious situation because




2. Reproduction Cost New
Another method of determining the rate base is
known as reproduction cost new less depreciation, or RCND
(an abbreviation used by Garfield [22]). The RCND is a
measure of the cost of duplicating the existing plant at
recent or present prices, less depreciation. One method
of assessing RCND is called "trended original cost." This
method employs various index numbers of prices in order to
convert the actual investment cost experienced by the
company into the equivalent value as expressed in current
dollars. This is done by multiplying the recorded actual
cost of each property unit or class by the ratio of the
appropriate index number of prices for the current year to
that of the year in which the property unit was installed,
as follows:
Trended original cost actual recorded , , .
of property unit in cost of the property naex ^
UITDer>
r . ~ current year
current year = in year of x ^installation Qf ^ yeap Qf
installation
Thus the RCND rate base takes into account changes in the
value of money. As a result it is capable of stabilizing
the real income of common stockholders in utility enter-
prises. The use of RCND also can result in flexible rates
which are higher when prices are high and lower when prices
decline. Higher rates tend to prevent possible artificial
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stimulation of the demand for utility services which other-
wise might occur if such service were underpriced in terms
of the real value of money.
3. Fair Value
The fair-value rate base is a composite which gives
weight to both depreciated actual cost and RCND. The amount
of weight given to each of these indications of value may,
according to Garfield [22], vary from case to case and also
from State to State. Whatever the percentage may be given
to each, the sum of both becomes the fixed part of the total
fair-value make-up besides working capital and going-concern
value.
It would seem that in any case the total of fixed
capital and working captial would be enough to cover the
full range of corporate investment to be compounded into a
total amount of fair-value. But to this total value had
to be added the separately "going-concern" value. Going-
concern value is the excess valuation over fixed capital
which arises due to the fact that the assets are in opera-
tion, with established management, employees, experience
and customers, and with assumed potentials of service
expansion.
Since the determination of going-concern value is
highly subjective, it is of course open to serious questions
as to its fairness to the consumer. Therefore it should be
abandoned and be replaced by a more reasonable measure such




In the course of discussion in Section II we came
to the conclusion that for a rigid plant the cost function








where b is the short-run marginal cost and 3 is the long-run
marginal cost (the cost of providing a unit of capacity)
.
However, it has been the conclusion of this section that the
determination of marginal cost is extremely difficult if not
impossible. What we can get, and that used in practice, is
the average cost. The method introduced by Da Silva for
determining the short-run marginal cost of generation is
perfect as long as the company owns only one type of genera-
tion plant, i.e., thermal. In the case of a mix of hydro
and thermal plants where the percentage of hydro plants is
substantial, averaging the total marginal costs of the
entire utility plants is unavoidable, except, if we are
willing to use the marginal cost of generation of the
thermal plant as representing the whole utility generating
plants. Since the short-run marginal cost of generation of
a thermal plant is greater than that of a hydro-plant,
taking this step means a gain for the utility company.
However, the possibility of calculating marginal cost stops
here, because of the fact that in transmission and distri-
bution, the cost can be determined only for a specified
period. Whence, average cost is the only possible result.
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The RCND method of evaluating the net assets is
clearly better than the actual cost because of the fact that
it takes into consideration the change in money value. The
fair-value method is the worst of the three and since today
it is used only by a few minor companies, the retirement of





The costs of electric generation, transmission and dis-
tribution are maintained in the uniform system of accounts
prescribed by each commission for the utilities under its
jurisdiction. In addition, each utility files a detailed
annual report with the commission, with all data stated
on the basis of the accounts and sub-accounts of the pre-
scribed accounting system. Cost data in this form are not
directly usable in cost analysis developed to aid in the
design of rates. Accordingly, it is necessary to undertake
the following procedure: a) classification of the total
cost of service into three basic categories, called customer
costs, energy costs, and demand or capacity costs; b) allo-
cation and distribution of the classified costs to customer
classes or types of load; and c) totaling the customer,
energy and capacity costs thus assigned to each customer
class to provide a basis for determining the average costs
of supplying the respective classes of service.
The classification of costs to the customer, energy and
demand categories was first proposed by W.J. Greene in 1896,
and now it is the most widely used in the United States.
Houthakker [18] divides the total cost of service into four





The customer costs are those operating and capital costs
found to vary with number of customers regardless, almost,
of power consumption. Included as a minimum are the costs
of metering, billing, collecting and accounting (as an exam-
ple, residential customers in the Monterey area are charged,
in 1973, $0.65 per month of customer charge and $0.65 per
month of minimum charge). Customer costs may be distributed
to respective groups in proportion to the number of customers
in each one. The really controversial aspect of customer
cost imputation, as indicated in the previous section, arises
because of the common practice by the utility company of
including not just those costs that can be definitely ear-
marked as incurred for the benefit of specific customers
but also a substantial fraction of the annual maintenance
and capital costs of the secondary (low voltage) distribution
system. Their inclusion among the customer costs, according
to Bonbright [11], is defended on the ground that, since
they vary directly with the area of the distribution system
(or else with lengths of the distribution lines, depending
on the type of the distribution system) , they therefore vary
indirectly with the number of customers. This reason is,
of course, very hard to accept because the area where the
utility operates is almost constant over the years. What
actually happens is that, all the un-allocated costs remaining
are "dumped" in the customer-cost category as a result of
the company's determination to fully distribute total costs
of service among customers. It is therefore not surprising
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that Houthakker added the fourth category, residual costs,
in his total costs division as a means of coping with the
difficulty of un-allocated costs. The following table is
an example of the above discussion, the inclusion of a sub-
stantial fraction of the annual maintenance and capital costs
of the secondary distribution system, a practice of the
PG and E:
TABLE 4
Summary of Classification of Rate-base Items































The energy-cost category of the three-fold division of
the total annual costs is supposed to consist of those costs
which would vary with the changes in consumption of energy,
measured in kilowatt-hours, even if the number of customers
should remain constant and even if there were no change in
maximum load upon the system or subsystem as measured in
kilowatts or kilo volt amperes. The most obvious costs of
this character are fuel costs, although a small portion of
these costs may be regarded as demand-related on the ground
that some fuel is required in order to maintain spinning
reserve, that is, to keep the quality of service from
deteriorating in the advent of a sudden increase in demand.
Energy cost may be distributed to customer groups on
the basis of kilowatt-hours of energy consumed in the test
period, or kilowatt-hours plus energy losses. The relative
kilowatt-hour consumption of customer classes determines
how much of the total energy related costs was assigned to
each class. Table (5) is an example of energy, costs allo-
cation to customer classes (that of PG and E), the summary
of which is as follows:
Sales adjusted to transmission input:
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Sales adjusted to distribution input:







Recall also that it is customary for the utility company
to include a fraction of the maintenance costs of the
generating plant in the energy-cost make-up.
The capacity costs include the major part of the total
allowance for depreciation, taxes, insurance, return on
investment and a substantial part of the operating and
maintenance expenses. In accounting terms, this cost com-
ponent is called the annual fixed changes. The following




Fixed Charges Rate - 30 Years Service Life
of Conventional Steam Generating Equipment
Cost of money Q.2%
Depreciation and replacements 1.2J8
Insurance 0.2$





Assuming that the annual fixed charges have been determined,
the question arises as to the proper apportionment among, or
allocation to, services supplied at different load factors
and at different times of day or season. These services
share responsibility in different degree for the creation
of the system and sub-system peak loads and indirectly for
the capacity costs.
Demand or capacity costs require an allocation to classes
of customers on the basis of one of the many formulas avail-
able for this purpose. The most commonly used in the United
States are: a) the peak responsibility formula, b) the
non-coincidental-demand formula and c) the average-and-excess-
demand formula.
B. ALLOCATION OF DEMAND COSTS
1. Peak Responsibility Method
Here, the entire capital costs are imputed to those
services that are rendered at the time of the system peak
(or sub-system peak) and in proportion to the kilowatt demand
imposed at this time - an integrated demand rather than
instantaneous demand, measured over some short period of
time such as thirty minutes or longer. Service rendered
completely off-peak would be assigned no responsibility
whatever for the capacity costs. This method, therefore,
is in complete agreement with the results given by Boiteux,
Steiner, Mohring and Pressman. Thus, for example, with a




Class Peak Allocation Capacity
Load Responsibility Percentage {%) Allocated
A 400 KW 40 400 KWB0
C 600 60 600
1,000 100 1,000
In applying the peak responsibility method to a
group of individual customers, the load factor versus
coincidence relationships introduced by Bary [2] is commonly
used.
Bary recognizes the existence of the relationships
between load factor and coincidence factor of individual
customer in a group. It should be noted that load factor
versus coincidence approach may not be applicable in the
case of a single customer whose load represents a large
percentage of the utility's total load system. A typical
Bary curve for groups of small customers is represented in
Figure (2). The diagonal line on that figure, running from
zero to 100$ load factor marks the theoretical lower limit
of coincidence for large groups of customers; the upper
limit is, of course the 100$ coincidence line.
Figure (3) portrays, as an example, a hypothetical
load factor-coincidence pattern for a small group of large
customers. The coincidence factor for each customer spotted
on the figure is the ratio of his demand, at a specified
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PERCENT LOAD FACTOR - INDIVIDUAL CUSTOMERS


























time, to his maximum demand during the period being studied.
The zero load intercept of the straight line fit for those
five data points can be computed as follows:
Load Coincidence
Factor Actual Formula
40 % 0.850 x + 0.40(1.00 - x)
45 0.775 x + 0.45(1.00 - x)
50 0.830 x + 0.50(1.00 - x)
60 0.920 x + 0.60(1.00 - x)
65 0.905 x + 0.65(1.00 - x)
4.280 = 6x + 2.60(1.00 - x_
x = 0.70 this is the zero
load intercept
Using this method, the demand charge is based on the capac-
ity cost at 100$ load factor times the coincidence factor at
zero load factor, and the remaining capacity cost is included
on a kilowatt hour basis by spreading over the hours in the
period; a Hopkinson demand rate results.
Example
:
capacity cost per KW per month : $3.00
coincidence at zero load factor : 70%
730 hours of operation in a month
demand charge = $3.00 x 0.70 = $2.10
$3.00 - $2.10
capacity cost in energy charge
730
= 1.23 mill/KWH
Therefore, the enrgy charge would be added to the 1.23 mills
figure in setting up a rate.
60
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2. Non-Coincidence Demand Method
The non-coincidence demand method is also known as
maximum demand method. The theoretical basis of this method
provides that joint-demand costs incurred in serving a num-
ber of customer groups should be allocated in proportion to
the facilities necessary to serve each customer group separ-
ately. Accordingly, this method looks to class peak demands,
regardless of the time of the occurence. These steps are
required: a) the peak demands of each class, regardless
of time of occurrence, are added to find the sum of the
maximum class demands; and b) allocation of system demand
costs to each class is calculated on the basis of ratio of










A 1,500 KW 50.00 1,000 KW







In actual practice, the load factor of each class of service
is taken into account to arrive at the percentage of alloca-




- Average demand (MW) =2,033-2 MW
- % load factor = kl%
- Maximum demand = 2,033.2 = 4,959.0 KW
0.41
- Demand as % of distribution input = 90 . 4?g
- Demand at distribution input =
^ffiffrij = 5,485.6
- Total demand of all classes
at distribution input = 13,485.8 MW
- % allocation to residential
class "13*485*8 = k0 - 6Q%
3. The Average Demand-and-Excess Method
The average demand-and-excess method was introduced
by Caywood [12] and is also widely used in the United States
With this method, the portion of facilities required to
serve the average load is allocated on this basis, and the
remainder is allocated by applying the non-coincidence
demand method.
This method avoids the shortcomings of both peak
responsibility method and the non-coincidence demand method,
in as much as maximum loads, rather than loads at the time
of the system peak, are used and the extent of use of
equipment is taken into account. For example:
Class" load Max. demand % load factor Allocation
A 500 KW 50 371 KW
B 200 100 200
C 800 10 429
1,500 KW 1,000 KW
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The necessary computations are as follows:
- Average load = (0.50 x 500) + (1.00 x 200)
+ (0.10 x 800) = 530
- Excess load = 1,000 - 530 = 470
(the total allocated demand of 1,000 KW can
be found using the non-coincidence method)
- Average load allocation:
A = 250 KW = 250 x 8960 =
B = 200 KW = 200 x 8760 =




A = 500 - 250 = 250
B = 200 - 200
C = 800 - 80 = 720








A = 250 x 470/970 = 121
B = x 470/970 =
C
,4-al .
= 720 x 470/970 = 349
1 Id .
A = 250 + 121 = 371
B = 200 + 200
C = 80 + 349 = 429
1,000
The average-and-excess demand method can also be




Kx + Dy = C
8,760x + y = |
and
where :
C = total annual cost
P = maximum demand of the system
D = sum of class demands
K total energy use
x = cost per KWH for capacity related to energy
y = cost per KW for capacity realted to load
Using the above example for values of P, D and K; and
assuming further that C = $50,000, we get:
4,642, 800x + l,500y = $50,000
8 760x + y = £50^000o, fOUX x y 1,000
And the solutions are: x = 2.94 mills
y = $24.23
Allocation for loads A, B and C are:
A = 2,190,000 x 2.9^ mills + 500 x $24.23 = $18,550
B = 1,752,000 x 2.94 mills + 200 x $24.23 = $10,000
C = 700,800 x 2.94 mills + 800 x $24.23 = $21,450
4,642,800 1,500 $50,000
The above result checks with the allocations made by the
long method, that is,
A = 371 x $50 = $18,550
B = 200 x $50 = $10,000




The load factor-allocation curve for the average and excess
demand method Is a straight line, and its zero intercept
can be determined by the following formula:
(SP-SAp(CP-CAL)
, rflT
Class allocation = Sum (NCP-SAL) _^
where
:
SP = system peak
SAL = system average load
CP = class peak
CAL = class average load





The following terminology is used in discussing the
tariff of an electric utility:
a) Rate; the prices for electric service
b) Schedule; the rate plus several provisions
necessary for billing for various
load conditions of customers
c) Rules -and regulations; a statement of the
general practices the utility follows
in carrying on its business
d) Tariff; all the schedules and rules and
regulations of the utility.
Rates for electric service are nothing more than price tags
which the electric utility places on the service it renders.
Well-rounded rates integrate within themselves the essential
policies and practices of the utility with respect to:
a) Engineering of the supply system (such as design,
voltage standards, minimum reserve etc)
b) Operation of the supply system (such as maintenance
standard, operating reserves, equipment
loading, etc)
c) Accounting (such as depreciation standards, method
of valuation, etc)
d) Finance (such as ratios of capital structure,
dividend pay-outs, etc)
e) Sales (such as direction of promotional efforts,
administration of contracts, etc)
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f) Legal (such as franchise requirements, state
laws for utilities, etc).
B. PRICING POLICIES
Pricing is the final step in the over-all rate-making
process. Under the conventional practice, as discussed in
Section III, pricing becomes a matter of regulatory concern
after commission determination of the utility's approved cost
of service, including a fair return. Public utility rates
are intended to accomplish much more than to produce revenues
equivalent to" the approved cost of service. They are also
intended to apportion the company-wide cost of service among
consumers in a reasonable manner and to provide an effective
instrument for the marketing of public utility services.
Unlike some of the matters considered up to this point,
such as rate base, depreciation, operating and maintenance
costs, and rate of return, there has been relatively little
controversy in the area of rate structures. The following
are the basic rate-making principles and practices which
have become generally accepted through the years in the
United States.
1. Differential Pricing
It would be ideal if the utility could sell electric
service on one simple rate at a single price of, say, 2
cents per kilowatt-hour. Customers would easily understand
such rates, and billing would be simplified, and overhead
costs would be reduced. However, the utility cannot take
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advantage of this rate utopia because of the wide differences
in customers' electric service requirements. Also, if an
attempt were made to sell all service at one average price,
the utility would lose the business of those customers who
could obtain kilowatt-hours at a cheaper price from some
other source, and rates for remaining customers would go up.
Instead, a) relatively homogeneous groups of customers,
called customer classes, are established; b) a different
schedule is applied to each class; and c) each ordinarily
offers the individual customers within each class a gradu-
ated, descending scale of rates for incremental blocks of
service taken. Accordingly, public utilities engage in
"differential pricing" rather than uniform pricing, primarily
because different schedules of rates apply to different
classes of customers such as: residential, commercial,
industrial, rural area, street lighting,, etc. Three condi-
tions are necessary, according to Liebhafsky [23], in order
for differential pricing to be possible, i.e. a) monopoly
or near monopoly; b) a total demand that can be subdivided
into separate markets, each with different price elasticities
of demand and c) some means of insulating each market from
others, so that those who buy at the lower prices cannot
resell to those who would have to pay higher prices. As
we have seen in Section II, public utilities fit into this




The classification of customers is based upon two
principal factors, i.e. the "size" of the consumer - as
measured by the number of kilowatt-hours consumed per month
or the maximum demand or both, and the purpose to which the
public utility service is devoted [PPC Survey 1970]. Other
factors taken into account may be the quality of service,
the time at which the service is required, and the stability
of demand from year to year. Each schedule states in detail
the class of customers to which it applies, the nature of
the service to be provided, the method of calculating the
bill, and other terms and conditions affecting the sale.
2. General Objectives of Utility Pricing Policies
A public utility's rate structures were designed to
accomplish the following general objectives: a) produce
revenues equivalent to the approved cost of service, b) max-
imize utilization of fixed plant, c) assure maximum stability
of revenues, d) distribute the total cost of service reason-
ably among different classes of customers, and e) promote
and retain the maximum economic development of its market.
Except for the first objective, practical necessity
often requires a balancing of objectives when the fullest
achievement of one conflicts with the fullest achievement
of another. To accomplish these ends, the guiding principle
in the design of rate structures calls for consideration of
both: the costs, or relative cost differences of supplying
each class of customers or service; and the value of service
or, in other words the demand characteristics of the different
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segments of the total market served by the utility. The
first of these is a recognition of the demand side, while
the latter is a reflection of the supply side of the market.
3. Value of Service
The term value of service, in the context of public
utility pricing principles, refers to the conditions of
demand which characterize- the different segments of a
utility's market. In Jefferson's words [20], "the rate man's
term value of service happens to be the same as the economist's
term elasticity of demand". Thus a low value of service
corresponds to an elastic demand and a high value of service
corresponds to an elastic demand. Recall, that Pressman
(in Section II) developed his mathematical formulation of
variable load pricing along the line of the value of service
which he incorporated in his consumers' surplus concept.
So did Steiner [31], Manne [27] and others. As a result of
the above, in the matter of pricing utility services, it
would be erroneous to look solely to the result of cost
analyses, for they cannot provide useful information with
respect to the value of such services on what the public
may be willing to pay for them.
C. RATE FORMS
It is a generally accepted principle of public utility
rate making that differences in the conditions of demand,
as among the respective customer classes, indicate that each
class has a different capacity and willingness to bear
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charges. Accordingly, with reference to value of service
factors, rates are made so as to distribute the approved
company-wide cost of service in relation to the capacity
and willingness of the customer groups to bear such cost.
There are two basic forms of electric rates in use in
the United States for general classes of service: one employs
energy use as the sole parameter for pricing of service
rendered, and the other employs energy use and maximum
demands as dual parameters of the service rendered. The
controlling characteristic of the first type is the energy
used by customers, and the second type, the customers' load
factors and their demand for capacity. There are other types,
but they are confined to special applications.
1. Flat Demand Rate
The flat demand rate consists of a price of so much
per kilowatt for a specified time, say, a month or year.
Such a charge is possible where the use of the equipment
and, therefore, the kilowatt-hour consumption are known.
The charge is normally based on connected load, so that
metering is not required. The prices may be "blocked", or
discounts varying with total gross bill (quantity discounts)
may be used to give lower charges for larger loads. This
type of charge is often used today fro street lighting
service, in which case the burning schedule is under the




First $100 of gross monthly bill net
Next $400 " " " 5% discount
Next $1000 " " " 1555 discount
Additional " " " 25% discount
The difference between the initial discount and the final
discount constitutes what might be termed a customer charge
In the above examDle, this amount is:
(25% - 0%) x $100 = $25
(25% - 5%) x $400 = $80
(25% - 15%) x $1000 = $100
Customer charge = $205
Thus, for gross monthly bills of $1,500 or more, the net
bill may be calculated by the following formula:
(100% - 25%) x gross bill + $205.
2. Block Meter Rate
The block meter rate specifies certain prices per
kilowatt-hour for various kilowatt-hour blocks, the price
per kilowatt-hour decreasing for succeeding blocks. The
rate is simple, easily understood by customers, and widely
applied today to residential and other small users. In its
basic form, it does not recognize the demand element. The
following is a block meter rate for Monterey area in 1973
[PG and E schedule D-3].
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First 50 KWH, per KWH 4.529 *
Next 50 KWH, per KWH 3.429 <fr
Next 100 KWH, per KWH 2.429 <fr
Next 100 KWH, per KWH 1.629 *
Next 700 KWH, per KWH 1.529 <fr
Over 1000 KWH, per KWH 1.329 <t
plus
customer charge $0.65
a modification of the block meter rate with a minimum charge
is the so-called initial charge rate. This form has a first
kilowatt-hour block for a certain total amount, which is
also a minimum charge. For example, the PG and E schedule
A-3 for Monterey area in 1973 is:
customer charge a
q g^
energy charge (in addition to
customer charge):
First 100 KWH, per KWH 4.529 <fc
Next 200 KWH, per KWH 4.029 <fr
Next 700 KWH, per KWH 3-729 $
Next 2,000 KWH, per KWH 3.129 <fr
Over 3,000 KWH, per KWH 2.029*
minimum charge per month $0.65
The end blocks are usually priced low enough to induce larger
use, but high enough to recover deficits produced by customers
with small use and to cover cost of service at a specified
diversified load factor for larger uses. Bary [ ] proposed
an additional provision, i.e., the minimum earned rate to
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the above schedule as a protection against the possibility
of lower diversified load factor in the very high energy
use region.
3. Hopkinson Demand Rate
In 1892, Dr. John Hopkinson proposed a two-part rate
consisting of separate charges for demand and for energy and
thus recognizing load factor. This type of rate is used
mostly for medium- and large-sized commercial and industrial
loads. Either the demand charge or the energycharge or both
in the Hopkinson demand form of rate may be block to give
lower prices for higher loads and greater consumption.
This rate form is known as a block Hopkinson demand rate.




First 1,000 KW of billing demand $1,500.00
Over 1,000 KW of billing demand,
per KW $ 1.00
Energy charge:
First 100 KWH, per KWH 1.249*
Next 200 KWH, per KWH 0.749*
All- excess, per KWH 0.6794:
The fixed amount or the customer charge is developed as
follows:
($1.50 - $1.00 ) x 1000 KW = $50
(1.249* - 0.679* ) x 100 KWH = $57
(0.749* - 0.679* ) x 200 KWH = $14
customer charge = $121.
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Thus for a load of over 2000 KW and energy use of over 300
KWH the billing can be computed using the following formula:
monthly bill = $121 + $1.50 per KW + 0.679* per KWH.
k. Wright Demand Rate
Arthur Wright was the second British engineer to
design a rate form recognizing both load and energy, in
which there are a number of energy blocks with decreasing
prices for succeeding blocks and in which the sizes of the
energy blocks increase with size of load. The effect is to
give demand and energy charges. Load factor is thus recog-
nized. The hours' -use rate is applied mostly to medium-
sized customers, but in some cases it is used for extremely
large loads. Discounts, varying with the total gross bill,
are sometimes applied to give lower prices for larger loads.
For example:
First 50 hours' use per month or
50 KWH per KW of demand, per hour 3*
Next 100 hours' use, per hour 2<J:
Additional, per hour 14:
Assume a load of 200 KW and a monthly use of 60,000 KWH,
the bill is calculated as follows:
(50 hours' use x 200 KW) x 3<fc = 10,000 x 3* = $300
(100 hours' use x 200 KW) x 2i = 20,000 x 2<J: = $400
30,000 x 1<E = $300
Total bill = $1,000
75

The demand charge can be developed as follows:
(3$ - 1$) x 50 hours' use = $1.00
(2<fr - IjQ x 100 hours' use = $1.00
demand charge = $2.00
Thus for usage of more than 150 hours per month the billing
formula is
monthly bill = $2.00 per KW + l<fr per KWH.
This rate in effect gives the same price per KWH for the
same load-factor for any load, unless quantity discounts or
some other device is used to recognize load size. A combi-
nation of the block meter rate and the Wright demand rate is
commonly used now, particularly for small customers.
D. FUEL COST ADJUSTMENT
As shown in Section III, the cost of fuel is a major
item of expense. For this reason, a fuel cost adjustment is
often used to permit a utility to follow the variations in
fuel costs either up or down. The following examples are
given by Caywood [12] in terms of coal price. The examples
are based upon the following assumptions:
base coal price of $5.00 per ton
- base coal price of $0.20 per million BTU
- 12,500 BTU per pound of coal
- line efficiency of 90$, giving 15 3 556 BTU
(based on 14,000 BTU)
average heat rate 14,000 BTU per net kilowatt generated





The energy charge will be increased or decreased at
the rate of 0.156 mill per KWH for each 25-cents increase or
decrease in the price of coal above or below the base price
of $5.00-per ton. The calculations are
:
2 5 x 10 BTU per ton _ , £ n7 ...„, ^^ . „
15,556 BTU per KWH 1 > 6 ° 7 KWH per t0n '
and
25<t per ton n ->cc #»«
1,607
= °' 156 mil1 *
2. Type-B Adjustment
The energy charge will be increased or decreased at
the rate of O.156 mill per KWH for each 1-cent increase or
decrease in the price of coal above or below the base price
of 20 cents per million BTU. The calculations are:
1,000,000 C\\ -> t^tttt ,,,, DmTT?c ccg— = 64.3 KWH per million BTU
£^i~ = 0.156 mill.
The type A adjustment is widely used because the
terminology is easily understood. However, the type B
adjustment is more sensitive to actual changes in fuel costs,
inasmuch as it is based on heat units rather than on tons.
(PG and E uses type B adjustment, and their figure is 0.159
mill). In some clauses, there are two base prices, a lower
value below which charges are decreased and an upper value
above which charges are increased. The range in between
needs no adjustment at all.
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E. BILLING DEMAND PROVISIONS
Several factors enter into the calculation of billing
demand, as part of the schedule provisions. Load peaks may
be for different time intervals; a single peak may be used
or several peaks may be average; the instantaneous peaks of
highly fluctuating loads may be recognized; kilowatt loads
may be corrected for power factor; and off-peak loads may
be related to loads created during on-peak hours and taken
at a reduced value.
1. Peak Width and Peak Averaging
Where measured demands are used for billing, peak
width of 5, 15, 30, and even 60 minutes are used. Sometimes
only a single peak is recognized [Boiteux and Stassi]; then
again two or more daily peaks [Williamson, Houthakker] or
weekly peaks may be averaged [Bary]. Peak width and peak
averaging can theoretically be tied in with the level of
the demand charge, so that a narrow single peak and its
demand charge will give the same over-all result as a wider
peak or an average of several peaks. Connected load count
is sometimes used instead of metered demands, particularly
for small loads where the revenue involved is not sufficient
to justify the expense of demand metering. Usually a




High peaks of short duration are common for loads of
equipment such as hoists. A charge is often made for such
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peaks when they materially exceed the basic peak used in
a schedule. Such a charge is justified because of the
higher capacity equipment needed to give proper voltage
regulation under such conditions.
3. Voltage Discount
This is a discount applied to demand, kilowatt-hour
consumption, or total bill to recognize lower utility costs
when the customer does some of the transforming to lower
voltages. The amount of discount depends upon the size of
the load and the source of the supply, i.e., froma 22KVOLT
service or higher voltage service
.
k . Power Factor
The economic approach is to make the power factor
charge represent the cost to the utility of supplying correc-
tive capacity. Conceptually, then, if the customer can
correct for power factor at a cost cheaper than the charge
in the rate, he will do so, and the most economical result
will be obtained. In determining utility costs, any expenses
relative to additional voltage regulation made necessary by
the customer's capacitor installation should be included.
(The utility gains when capacitors are installed on indivi-
dual machines because this aids in voltage regulation by
keeping the voltage from rising as high when the load is
reduced as it does when capacitors are on the main switch.)
Utility policies regarding the treatment of the power factor
in rates vary widely, as indicated by the following approach:
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a) Charge on the basis of kilowatts with the utility
correcting for power factor and, in effect, averaging
the cost over all customers.
b) Charge on the basis of kilowatts, assuming that bad
power factor conditions will be corrected by the
customer to realize advantages in his own plant.
c) Make a power factor charge. Some utilities recognize
power factor improvement by the customer only when the
customer's corrective equipment is installed according
to utility requirements.
Power factor provisions are not normally found in rates for
small loads because of the high cost of metering compared
with revenue received from the charge, the added schedule
and billing complications, and above all the difficulty of
explaining power factor to the customers. Billing on the
basis of kilowatt load time the ratio of a base power factor
to actual power factor is commonly used, where the base
power factor is taken at 80$ or 85$.
5. Minimum Charge and Demand Rachets
A minimum charge of a fixed amount or of so much per
unit of billing demand is usually included to give the util-
ity some revenue from the convenience user or of the low
load factor customer. In the case of rates having a demand
charge, this charge is usually the minimum. It is common
practice in the case of larger loads to base the minimum
or demand charge on a ratcheted demand, that is, the highest
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demand of the last 12 months, the highest of the term, the
average demand of the last 12 months, or some percentage
of values such as these.
6. Term
Schedules for larger loads in particular carry term
provisions which require that the customer sign a contract




VI. IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STANDARDS
ON ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION
A. GENERAL
Currently, more than 80$ of the electric energy produced
In the United States is generated by steam-electric plants.
At the exhaust of a steam-electric plant turbine, the steam
is condensed to water to maximize the energy conversion and
then is returned to the boiler or reactor for a repetition
of the cycle. A large amount of heat is rejected in the
condensing process. All waste heat from steam-electric
plants must eventually be dissipated to the atmosphere.
Some heat is transferred directly to the ambient air and,
in the case of fossil-fueled plants, some heat is discharged
up the stacks. However, the bulk of the waste heat is
transferred from the steam to the cooling waters in the
condensers. Waste heat discharged to water bodies, which
contributes to physical and biological changes, is called
the thermal pollution. Growing concern for environmental
protection is increasingly requiring the reduction of waste
heat discharged to water bodies.
Beside the efforts in reducing thermal pollution, reducing
air pollution from fossil-fueled steam-electric plants to
acceptable levels is one of the major challenges facing the
electric utility industry. The most significant air pollu-
tants associated with power plants are carbon monoxide (CO),
sulfur oxides (SO ), nitrogen oxides (NO ) , hydrocarbons (HC),A A
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and particulate matter. Because of the amounts released
and because of their potential hazards, only SO , NO ,
x x
and the particulates will be considered. Figures below
show the relative amounts of pollutants in the U.S. released
by fossil-fueled plants.
TABLE 7
Percent of Total Amount of Pollutants
Released by Fossil-fueled Plants
Pollutant Fuel Type PercentCoal Oil Natural Gas Total
SO 42.7 3.3 - 46.0
N0 Y 15.8 0.3 2.9 19.0
Particulates 10.5 0.1 - 10.6
Source: F.P.C. National Power Survey, 1970.
B. THERMAL POLLUTION
Thermal pollution is significantly different from other
forms of pollution, since, unlike chemical wastes or sewage,
it does not involve the addition of foreign matter to the
environment and the heat is usually dissipated into the
atmosphere rather quickly. The addition of heat to water
bodies, however, may increase rates of chemical solubility
and biochemical reactions, causing effects on aquatic organ-
isms in the area of higher temperatures. All aquatic species
have an optimum temperature range. If the water temperature
varies above or below this range the chances of survival for
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a particular species decrease. Rapid change in temperature
caused by thermal plant start-up and shut-down can be lethal
to organism in the effected area. Furthermore, an increase
in the water temperature is always coupled with a decrease
in ability of the water to hold oxygen, which is an adverse
effect toward aquatic vertebrae.
A "safe" temperature has been defined by the Atomic
Energy Commission as "the temperature which must persist
as a mean temperature in order to protect whatever stage
the organism is in". No definite average standards were
given because they depend very much on local conditions,
such as depth and speed of the stream, species living in
it, etc.
The principal types of cooling system now in use or
proposed for steam-electric plants are: a) once-through
cooling using fresh or saline water, b) cooling ponds, in-
cluding spray ponds, c) wet cooling towers, and d) dry
cooling towers. In some cases a combination of .systems may
be used. The water withdrawal requirement varies widely
among these systems, hence the choice between these techniques
depends heavily on the availability of water, that is, its
temperature, flow and speed.
The cost elements to be considered for thermal pollution
control purposes are the capital costs and the operating
costs. The Federal Power Commission gives the following




Type of System Investment costs $/KW (1970)














For dry towers, the F.P.C.'s estimates for investment
costs range from $25 - $30 per kilowatt. Woodson in [5]
has computed the following estimates of the differential
production costs due to cooling for the different techniques
in mills/KWH for a 800 MW plant and a load factor of 80%
(1970):
TABLE 9




(river) mills/KWH 0.02 mills/KWH











The following table Is a result given us by S. Baron [5],
based on F.P.C. findings in 1970, for 1000 MW plant with
80JS load factor.
TABLE 10
Base Case, 1970 (1970 dollars; 1000 MW unit)
Oil-fueled Nuclear-fueled
Annual fixed charges
on construction cost 3.6 mills/KWH 5.6 mills/KWH
Fuel cost 4.0 1.8
Maintenance, Operating,
and insurance 0.2 0.4
Power generation cost 7-8 mills/KWH 7.8 mills/KWH
The comparison between different techniques shows that,
from an economic point of view, even wet towers with natural
draft do not add much to production costs. The difference
is much greater for dry towers. The difference between
fossil-fueled plants and nuclear plants arises from the
greater amount of waste heat that must be dissipated for
each kilowatt-hour produced. (Cooling efficiency in nuclear
plants - 10# lower than in fossil-fueled plants.)
C. AIR POLLUTION
Although the electric utility industry consumes about
one-fourth of all fuel burned in the United States, it con-
tributes only about one-eighth of the total mass of pollutants
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emitted into the Nation's air. Fossil-fueled power plants
have, until very recently, accounted for almost one-half
of the national total of sulfur oxide pollutant because of
the extensive use of sulfur-containing fuels. Other signi-
ficant pollutants, and the ones most difficult to control
in the utility furnaces, are the oxides of nitrogen. Power
plants account for about one-fifth of the national total.
The particulates emitted from electric power plants, which
are in most cases amenable to control, also account for
about one-fifth of the national total. Figures below are
estimates in i960 given by the F.P.C.:
TABLE 11
Estimated Emission from Fossil-fueled
Steam-Electric Power Plants in i960
373 NO" Particulate
Source Capacity - x % of % of % of











15.5 46.69 3.0 14.7 5.6 19.79
1.3 3.91 0.4 1.94 0.02 0.07
0.6 2.91
Total 1,093 16.8 50.60 4.0 19.42 5.62 19.86
1. Sulfur Oxides
In most utility combustion processes approximately
90 to 95 percent of the sulfur in fossil fuels is oxidized
87

and enters the flue gas as sulfur dioxide (SOp) and sulfur
trioxide (SO-), with about 97 percent of the SO being in
J x
the form of sulfur dioxide gas. Sulfur dioxide can be
injurious to human and animal health and to vegetation.
The small quantities of sulfur trioxide (S0_) are emitted
more in the form of an aerosol than as a gas. Sulfur tri-
oxide is highly corrosive which effects the plant and the
outside environment as well. Environmental standards for
SO and NO are listed in the following table:
TABLE 12
Environmental Standards on Air Pollution
Type of Concentration Discharges Yearly volume for


















lbs 5.31 x 10
11
116 x 10 3 lbs 2.02 x 10
11
47 x 10 3 5.77 x 109
0.027 x 103 4.5 x 107
26.6 x 10 3 3.22 x 109
Note that figures in the last column of the above table are
the yearly volume required for diluting the amounts released
in order to meet the standards for different fuels in use.
Several possibilities are envisioned for SO control,





- use of low sulphur fuel
removal of sulphur from oil or coal prior to
combustion
- removal of SOp from the stack gases.
Removal of sulphur from fuel prior to combustion is possible
for oil and for natural gas, in fact, in the U.S. natural
gas is usually delivered sulphur free. For coal a suitable
process has yet to be found [13].
Several techniques are possible for removing SOp
from stack gases. The processes envisioned to date as the
most interesting economically, use dolonite, alkalized alumina,
and catalytic oxidation. Other completely different solu-
tions to the problem of SOp pollution include: production
of electricity in places where the problem is less impor-
tant; the use of nuclear power plants; and the use of
hydro-electric power, the availability of which is very
limited.
Cost estimates for SOp control vary widely, for
example the Department of Interior, as quoted by Strauss
[33] s gives the following figures (prior to combustion
control)
:
a. removal of sulphur from oil (reducing the
sulphur content from 2.5$ to 0.5/8): $2 to $3
per ton or 8$ to 12$ per million BTU.
b. removal of sulphur from coal (reducing the
sulphur content from 3% to 1.5%): 50$ to 75$
per ton or 2$ to 3$ per million BTU.
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c. removal of SOp from the stack gases (90% of
SOp removed) : $1 to $2 per ton or J|$ to 8<J;
per million BTU.
These figures show that the process for removing sulphur
from coal prior to combustion, although cheap, gives the
fuel a content which is still too high to meet the standards
in most of the cases. Costs of removing sulphur from stack
gases are presently estimated, according to Strauss, to be
$0.75 to $1 per ton and are expected to decrease in the
future to the range of 20£ to 25$ per ton. The Battelle
Memorial Institute, as quoted by Sylvan Denis [13] 3 gives
the following orders of magnitude for the two processes it
has tested for a 800 MW plant burning 3% sulphur coal with


















Since construction costs and operating costs for S0
?
control
devices are themselves functions of plant size, Battelle
found the following relationship:
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(capital cost). size plant,
(capital cost). size plant.
And the formula for production cost is:
PC =
CC x K + A0C
8760 x LF x 10~ 2 x N
where :
PC = production costs ($/KWH)
CC = construction costs ($)
K = annualization factor for non-recurring
costs (mainly capital cost)
AOC = annual operating cost ($)
LF = load factor
N = generating capacity (KW)
.
It is interesting to note that all figures given above do
not include credits for sales of by-products, that is,
sulphur and sulphuric acid. Bettelle has estimated that
the quantity of sulphur, as the by-product of the combustion
of coal burned in one year, is roughly equivalent to the
quantity produced each year in the U.S. by conventional
method. And as an example, a cost of 0.5 mills/KWH for
sulphur removal is roughly equivalent to a cost of $45 per
ton of sulphur not released in the atmosphere, and that is
not much more than the present sulphur prices in the
Northeastern area of the United States. Therefore, if the
necessary technologies have been utilized, de-sulphurization
process could be self sustaining in terms of costs and no




The problem is rather different since the direct
health effects of the nitrogen oxides are less well known.
The main effect is photochemical smog, the formation of
which involves sunlight and is not yet fully explained.
Standards have been set but are likely to be lowered in
the future as the knowledge of NO effects is improved.
A
There are several possible means of controlling
power plant emissions of nitrogen oxides, basically they
are: a) improving the combustion process, b) using oil or
natural gas instead of coal, and c) removing NO from flue
A
gas. It is difficult to achieve complete control of NO
A
in power plants because of the interacting effects of
pollutants. The conditions favorable to high NO production
are. a result of combustion practices to achieve better power
plant operating efficiency and to control other pollutants.
According to the F.P.C. [35], five major factors that can
effect NO emissions are:
A
- the quantity of excess air for combustion, which
must be minimum
the pre-heat temperature, which must be minimum
- the heat release and removal rates
- the distribution and mixing of fuel and air
the fuel type and its nitrogen content.
The most interesting techniques to reduce NO emissions are
A
low-excess air fireing, two-stage combustion, flue gas
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recirculation or a combination of these techniques. Another
alternative is to remove NO from flue gases, which is also
A
interesting since the oxides of nitrogen and sulphur can
be removed at the same time. This is perhaps the reason
why cost estimates for NO treatment from flue gases per se
are not available. The only available cost estimate is that
given us by Denis [13] ; that is, for coal-fired plants the
costs range from -0.02 mills/KWH to O.36 mills/KWH, taking
into account a credit for S0
?
removal and sale of by-products
3. Particulates
Advances in automatic combustion controls have
helped eliminate smoke nuisance from power plants, and the
development of a variety of dust collectors has made it
possible to control the fly ash problems. There are two
general types of fly ash collecting equipment usually used
in power plants: mechanical separators and electrostatic
precipitators. Bag filters and wet scrubbers may also be
used to remove particles and are in operation in. some
industrial establishments and a few power plants.
The costs of precipitators increase rapidly at the
higher collection efficiencies. On the 500 - 800 MW plant,
a precipitator of 95$ efficiency may cost between $800 to
$1,200 per MW; one of 99$ efficiency may cost in excess
of $2,500 per MW [FPC estimate]. Other cost estimates,
such as operating and maintenance costs of these devices
are not available. However, judging from the description
of the processes currently in use, the operating and
maintenance costs will not be significant.
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As a summary of this section, if urban concentration
obliges one to set very tight standards for SOp emissions
(recall that NO removal can be done simultaneously with
that of SO ) , and if water availability and climatic condi-A
tions are such as to oblige the utility to use natural
draft dry cooling towers (which is the most expensive) in
order to meet the thermal standards, the production cost of
electricity (800 MW, 80% load factor) will increase, accord-
ing to Denis [13] » about 1.75 mills/KWH or according to
Baron's estimate [5] about 1.7 mills/KWH more than if no
control is done at all. These figures can then be taken
as approximate upper bounds for pollution control.
94

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDIES
A. CONCLUSIONS
It has been indicated in Section III that in order to
ensure the stability of the service, the utility company
is required to maintain at any time a reserve of capacity,
which is commonly called the spinning reserve, as a safety
margin above the actual demand. This requirement is met
by running extra generators. As a result, an additional
variable cost is incurred. However, only Bary [2] recognizes
its existence explicitly as a separate element of the total
annual variable costs. Theoretically, customers should
not be held responsible for the spinning reserve cost,
because it is neither a part of their demands nor an over-
head. But, in reality, the reverse is true.
Consider a collection of large customers, presumably
Government's installations, which operate under a budget
constraints and at the same time seek to maximize their
utility. To model various pricing policies which will be
applied to them, consider the following notation:
i = individual customer index
j = period index, or time interval index which
for the moment takes the values j =1,2




, y ), individual's utility function
x. = the i individual's consumption of the utility
J
y = the i individual's consumption of the







b the i individual's budget constraint
P. = the price charge to the i individual for his
^ consumption during period j; or equivalent ly,
the price of commodity (i,j)
K annual capacity cost for the use of the utility's
fixed assets.
i i i
c. = c, (x,,K) is the variable cost of producing




= c o-t( x o-i> K ) is tne
ith individual's share of the
SJ SJ SJ
spinning reserve in period j
.
Assume that the amount of spinning reserve is approximately
constant (i.e., the number of extra generators is constant),
then c . = c .
sj s
The first pricing policy that will be considered is
rf = P* , i = 1,2 and j = 1,2; that is we have (i x j)
different commodities (a differentiation of customers and
time of consumption) . Each individual utility maximization
can be portrayed as follows:
max z=u(x,, x
2 ,y) .... (1)
s.t
.
I PW + y 1 = b 1
j=l J J
The Lagrangian of the above is
L = ui (x^, x* a y
1
) + n
i [b i - Sj Pjxj - y 1 ]








3L n i I /0 x2—t- = = u - n (3)
ay *
fr = ° = bl - l i PH - yl w
an
Summing (4) over i yields:
B - E 1
Z
J
Pjxj - Y = ; B = Z^ 1 , Y = Z^ 1 (5)
Upon differentiating (5) with respect to P. we get:
P^x 1 + x"1" + P^x1 + Y 1 =




























And also differentiating (5) with respect to P. will get a
j
similar result except for the superscript. In general,




Z P, Z (x,.) + Z Y^ = (7)









^i 1 = 1 ' 2xj
9
p J 3 p i
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The Government is assumed to maximize social utility; i.e.,






Z Z ct + I c + K + Y = B
1=1 j=l J i=l s
2 2 i 2
2
i i
Z Z cl" + K = Z Z Pi"x^
i=l j*l J i=l j=l J J
The Lagrangian of (8) is
L = wCu-^u 2 ) + X[B - Z,Z. c* - c e - K - Y] +' i j j s
wC^Ij Pjxj - Zft oj - K] (9)
where c = Z. c is the total annual spinning reservesis °
The optimal size of the plant capacity can be found by













CjK 8K ana C sK 8K
The price of each commodity P. can be found by differentiating
j
(9) with respect to P., for all i and j:
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?3 = W1 CU1X11 + U2 X 21 +^
3 P1
+ XL-c11xn - c slxsl - y1 - c21 x21 ]
4- iiEP^ + x* + ?y21 - c^x^ - c^x^ - c sl xxl ]
=
























xj - (X+y)x* (11)
Similarly:























Summing up (11) and (12) we get
.1 -1 N-l ,1 _1 >_1 ,1 .1 N..1 ,1 -1 N„lCX+y)C(P£-cJ1 )xJ1 + (P2' c 21 )x21 + (P l~ C 12 )x12 + ( p 2- c 22 )x 22 ]
- ^ +y)t c
si xsi+c s2 xs2 ]
= w]n 1(xl+x 2 ) - (X+y)(xJ+x^)






















= w^EjxJ - CX+iOZjxJ J = 1,2 (13)
A similar result to that of (13) can be obtained if we















































E.x. - (X+y)E,x, for j = 1,2 (14)
The final formulation in a matrix form is. the result of










11 21 12 22






























w p n Z.x. - (X+y)Z.x.
where j 1,2 (15)
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112 2From (15) we can compute P-,, P-, P, and Pp which we know
that each one of them will contain the share of each
customer of the reserve cost. If we let i = 1,2,..., I and
J = 1,2,..., J, then we get the general formulation for this
pricing policy, that is






























































win E xj - (X+y) E Xj
j = l J 88 !
wT n Ex. - (X+y) E x
J-l J j=l
Since the elements of D and P are itself matrices, then the
appropriate thing to do is to define those element matrices
Let
:




p i i2~ c 2£
PJ- c JJl
XJ^ i = 1,2,. ..,1
JV ~™ 1 j £. j i » . j 1




X. = 1 } i } ... j J
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wTn Ex.- (X+y) Z x




Notice here that the number of elements of each D,« denotes
i
the number of time intervals ( j ) that we are interested in,
while the number of elements in a row of the D matrix
denotes the number of different tariffs that the utility has
The second pricing policy is a simplification of the
above, i.e., the utility differentiates only two time inter-
vals in which one of them covers the peak period and the
other covers the off peak period. The policy can be











p pr ll— II
p pr 12 —" 12
w n
1
l x]1 j=l J

















where each D. „ and P . „ has 2 elements.
The last pricing policy that will be considered is,
perhaps, the most simple from a practical point of view;
that is, P* = P. for all i (j = 1,2,..., J). In this policy,
J J
all customers are confronted with the same commodity in each
time interval. Thus the utility's revenue can be formulated
as:
I J . ,
Z Z P^x. = Z





Pt ( 2 xt)





J J where X. = Z. x.
The Lagrangian of the individual customer's utility
maximization is:
max L + y




xj--y 1 ] (19)
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where J = 1,2,..., J. Results of the first order conditions
of (19) will be similar to that of equations (2) through (4)
and the steps necessary from there on are the same, except,
now we have E. x. = X, .
The resource allocation problem facing the economy can
be written as:
max L = wCu 1 ,...^
1
) + A[B-£ .c.-c
s
-K-Y] + y T^j P i Xj~ S j cj~K ^
(20)
where: c, = the variable cost of producing electricity
during period j consumed by all customers,
that is, c. = c.(X,,K)
c = £., c , = c (X ,K) is the variable reserve cost
Consequently, the optimal plant size is given by differenti-
ating (19) with respect to K, which yields
-(X+u)[Ej c. K + c s + 1] = ; j = 1,2,. . . , J (21)
The first order conditions are:








t eMXM - c ssXsJ ] =
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where j = 1,2, ... ,J
Xl ~ 1 , C. j . . . j J
i = 1,2,...,!
i iMaking the appropriate values of u




-V^xJ + (X+^Xj +W cU )X Aj ] " C ssXsj = ° ( 22 )











2 w,n x, - (X+y)X,
i=i i x ' 1
±
i i :
s w,n Xt - (x+y)x T
i=1 i j j
(23)
J
From both equations (18) and (23) we can conclude that
the inclusion of capacity charges in the energy bill can be
justified on the ground that it represents the reserve cost
incurred at any point in time
.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDIES
We saw in Section V that there are three methods of
allocating capacity costs among customers: i.e., peak
responsiblity method, non-coincident peak and average-and-
excess demand method. The first method can well be
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portrayed through a pricing policy P, = P. for all i, in
which equation (23) is the result of such policy. The
second is well reflected by equation (18) where P. = P. for
all i and j . The third method, however, has received little
attention and provides an area for an interesting study.
The method was introduced by Caywood [12] and its formula-
tions were based upon empirical technical studies. Therefore
it needs an economic justification
The next area which will provide an interesting study is
the elasticity of demand for electricity by large customers,
should the Government decide to increase the price of
electricity as a result of a full crisis. This study should
be able to determine the optimal range of price increases




GLOSSARY OF COMMON TERMS
Capacity
Capacity factor
the load for which a machine, apparatus,
station or system is rated
the ratio of average load on a machine
or equipment for the period of time
considered to the rating of the
machine or equipment
Coincidence factor - the reciprocal of diversity factor
Coincident demand - any demand that occur simultaneously
with any other demand; also the sum










the ratio of the maximum demand of a
system, or part of a system, to the
total connected load of the system,
or part of the system under
consideration
the ratio of the sum of the non-
coincident maximum demands of the
various subdivisions of a system, or
part of a system, to the maximum
demand of the whole system, or part
under consideration
the difference between the peak of
coincident and non-coincident demands
of two or more individual loads
the ratio of the average load over a
designated period to the peak load
occurring in that period
the sum of the individual maximum
demands regardless of time of occurrence
within a specified period, usually not
more than one year
the product of the individual maximum




Peak day - the day within a stated period of
time in which the maximum demand
occurs
Peak demand - the greatest of a particular type of
demand occurring within a specified
period (= maximum demand)
Peak
responsibility - the load of a customer, a group of
customers, or part of a system at the
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